
Symmetric Cryptography ------ Asymmetric Cryptography Secret Key Cryptography Public Key Cryptography

Symmetric encryptionAsymmetric encryptionH-functions, Message digestE-signature - Public KeyHMAC H-Message Authentication CodeE-money, BlockchainE-votingE-voting

E-signature - Public Key Infrastructure - PKI E-money, Blockchain E-voting Digital Rights Management - DRM (Marlin) Etc.



Public Key Cryptography - PKC

Principles of Public Key Cryptography

Instead of using single symmetric key shared in advance by the parties for realization of symmetric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography uses two *mathematically* related keys named as private key and public key we denote by **PrK** and **PuK** respectively.

PrK is a secret key owned *personally* by every user of cryptosystem and must be kept secretly. Due to the great importance of **PrK** secrecy for information security we labeled it in **red** color. **PuK** is a non-secret *personal* key and it is known for every user of cryptosystem and therefore we labeled it by **green** color. The loss of **PrK** causes a dramatic consequences comparable with those as losing password or pin code. This means that cryptographic identity of the user is lost. Then, for example, if user has no copy of **PrK** he get no access to his bank account. Moreover, his cryptocurrencies are lost forever. If **PrK** is got into the wrong hands, e.g. into adversary hands, then it reveals a way to impersonate the user. Since user's **PuK** is known for everybody then adversary knows his key pair (**PrK**, **Puk**) and can forge his Digital Signature, decrypt messages, get access to the data available to the user (bank account or cryptocurrency account) and etc.


Let function relating key pair (**PrK**, **Puk**) be *F*. Then in most cases of our study (if not declared opposite) this relation is expressed in the following way:

PuK=F(PrK).


In open cryptography according to Kerchoff principle function \mathbf{F} must be known to all users of cryptosystem while security is achieved by secrecy of cryptographic keys. To be more precise to compute **PuK** using function \mathbf{F} it must be defined using some parameters named as public parameters we denote by **PP** and color in blue that should be defined at the first step of cryptosystem creation. Since we will start from the cryptosystems based on discrete exponent function then these public parameters are

$\mathbf{PP} = (\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{g}).$
Notice that relation represents very important cause and consequence relation we name as the direct
relation: when given PrK we compute PuK .
Let us imagine that for given F we can find the inverse relation to compute PrK when PuK is given.
Abstractly this relation can be represented by the inverse function F^{-1} . Then
$\mathbf{PrK} = \mathbf{F}^{-1}(\mathbf{PuK}).$
In this case the secrecy of PrK is lost with all negative consequences above. To avoid these
undesirable consequences function <i>F</i> must be one-way function – OWF. In this case informally
OWF is defined in the following way:
1. The computation of its direct value PuK when PrK and F in are given is effective.
2. The computation of its inverse value PrK when PuK and F are given is infeasible, meaning that to
find <i>F</i> ⁻¹ is infeasible.
The one-wayness of <i>F</i> allow us to relate person with his/her PrK through the PuK . If <i>F</i> is 1-to-1,
then the pair (PrK , Puk) is unique. So PrK could be reckoned as a unique secret parameter
associated with certain person. This person can declare the possession or PrK by sharing his/her PuK
as his public parameter related with PrK and and at the same time not revealing PrK .
So, every user in asymmetric cryptography possesses key pair (PrK , PuK). Therefore, cryptosystems
based on asymmetric cryptography are named as Public Key CryptoSystems (PKCS).
We will consider the same two traditional (canonical) actors in our study, namely Alice and Bob.
Everybody is having the corresponding key pair (\mathbf{PrK}_A , \mathbf{PuK}_A) and (\mathbf{PrK}_B , \mathbf{PuK}_B) and are
exchanging with their public keys using open communication channel as indicated in figure below.
Animaction: Key generation
https://imimsociety.net/en/14-cryptography

Public Parameters PP = (p, g) $p \sim 2^{2048} \approx 10^{700}$; |p| = 2048 bits ≈ 700 decimal digits



We will use
$$|p| = 28$$
 bits.
To generate PrK and PuK we need to generate PP = (p,g)
>> $p = genstrongprime (28)$
PrK = x <-- randi ==> PuK = $a = g^x \mod p$
 $[P_rK] = 2048$ bits $[1, 2^{2048}]$
F is a madular exponent function; $F_{P,g}(x) = g^x \mod P = a$.
>> $a = mad_-exp(g, x, p)$ $(p) = zK$ bit Congth
4. St is easy to compute PuK = a when p, g and x are given.
2. St is interastible to find $P_rK = x$ when p, g and q are given.
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Open SSL software $[P_rK] = 2048$ bits $[1, 2^{2048}]$
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 $\vec{k}_{AW} = \vec{k}_1 = \vec{k}_{WA}$.

Zoe continues computations with Bob in the similar way. Zoe chooses at random $i \leftarrow \operatorname{rand}(\mathbb{Z}_p^*)$, computes $W_A = g^i \mod p$, and sends W_A to Bob thus impersonating Alice. Bob does not suspecting any badness, as usual, chooses at random $\nu \leftarrow \operatorname{rand}(\mathbb{Z}_{p}^{*})$, computes $t_B = g^{\nu} \mod p$, and sends t_B to Zoe thinking that he have sent it to Alice. Zoe and Bob after receiving t_B and W_B computes their secret keys k_{WB} and k_{BW} respectively $k_{WB} = (t_B)^i \mod p = (g^v)^i \mod p = g^{vi} \mod p$. $k_{BW} = (W_B)^v \mod p = (g^i)^v \mod p = g^{iv} \mod p$. And again, analogously to and Zoe and Bob agreed on the same secret key. $k_{BW} = k_2 = k_{WB}.$ As an outcome of MiM Attack parties have agreeded two secret keys: key k_1 between Alice and Zoe and k_2 between Zoe and Bob. M-message to be encrypted. M = Account No From || Money amount || Account No To 100 € $k_{AW} = k_1 = k_{WA}$ $Euc(k_1, M) = G$ $\int Dec(k_1, G) = M$ $k_{WB} = k_2 = k_{RM}$ $M' \neq M;$ Enc(k_2, M') = C' $k_{BW} = k_2 = k_{BW}$ M' - 10 000 € $Dec(k_2, G') = M'$ Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol - AKAP A: ArK=X·PuK=a. B: RK=y; PuK=b. RIKA=a. $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{U}}\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{B}}=\mathcal{D}$, KA, GA u - randi (Io*) " 1. Verification of 6, on the ta $Ver(a, \delta_A, t_A) = D \{0, 1\} = hF, T_{3}$ $t_4 = g^{\mu} m \rho d p$ Sign $(X, t_A) = 6_A = (r_A, s_A)$ 2. V - randi (2p*) tB=grmod p $Vet(b, \delta_B, t_B) = \mathbf{T} \qquad \underbrace{t_B, \delta_B}_{B} = 3. \quad Sign(\mathbf{g}, t_B) = \mathbf{G}_B = (\mathbf{r}_B, \mathbf{s}_B)$ $k_{AB} = (t_B)^{\mu} \mod p = k = (t_A)^{\mu} \mod p = k_{BA}$

 $z_{\sigma}: P_{r}K = z; P_{u}K = d, d$ B: ačiú CA - certification Authority Certicom P.A - Registration Authority E-signature - Public Key Infrastructure - PKI A: ArK=X; PuK=a. CA: PrK=u; PuKCA=C. TTP